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SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS: DECLINATION
DECISIONS, NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS,
AND THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHT TO CONFER
Zulkifl M. Zargar*
The state’s monopoly power over the institution of prosecution is a feature
as familiar as any in the American criminal justice system. That the criminal
proceeding is between the state and the defendant leaves little doubt as to the
identities of the victimized interest and the offender. But, in avenging societal
harm alone, the criminal process treats another victim—the crime victim—
as an outcast.
Beginning in the 1970s, the victim’s rights movement mobilized to address
this institutional neglect, and, by most accounts, it has triumphed. Federal
and state victim’s rights laws now empower victims to attend criminal
proceedings, deliver impact statements at sentencings, and collect restitution
awards. Perhaps no statutory right is as emblematic of the victim’s acquired
prominence in the criminal process than the right to confer with the
prosecutor, codified in the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004 and in
most states’ laws.
Conferral seems an intuitive mechanism to facilitate information transfer
regarding developments in a case. What remains unclear, however, is
whether the law contemplates the existence of a conferral right when there
is no case. What, if any, are prosecutors’ obligations to confer with crime
victims if they ultimately decline to bring charges?
This Note illustrates that victim exclusion, especially at the outset,
portends adverse consequences for both victims and the proper functioning
of the criminal process. In most jurisdictions, prosecutors are under no legal
obligation to confer with victims about their declination decisions, owing
primarily to a judicial reluctance to circumscribe and a statutory intent to
preserve prosecutorial discretion. This Note proposes that prosecutors’
offices promulgate internal guidelines to encourage—and, in some cases
require—victim conferral prior to a declination decision. The guidelines
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2015, Washington
University in St. Louis. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Bruce A. Green not only
for his insight and direction but also for planting the seed for this Note. I also thank Hannah
Silverman for her patience and excellent editorial work and the Fordham Law Review for its
unwavering support during an uncertain time. Finally, I thank my parents, Dr. Javaid A.
Zargar and Ambreen Zargar, for everything.
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would not aim to disturb such a decision nor would they create untenable
administrative burdens for criminal justice actors or frustrate their
discretion. Rather, they are animated by principles of procedural justice that
emphasize process over outcome and thus seek to encourage meaningful
conferral where victims are kept informed and their opinions solicited.
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INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system has long functioned on the assumption that
crime victims should behave like good Victorian children—seen but not
heard.
—Judge Alex Kozinski1
Why didn’t anyone consult me? I was the one who was kidnapped, not the
State of Virginia.
—Unnamed Crime Victim2

During an eight-year stretch between 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein and
several coconspirators sexually abused over thirty minor girls, some as young
as fourteen.3 Following a tip—and a two-year joint investigation with the
Palm Beach Police Department—the FBI referred the matter to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.4 As early as January
2007, Epstein’s defense counsel began negotiating with the U.S. Attorney’s
Office to avoid indictment.5 The U.S. Attorney’s Office simultaneously
corresponded with Epstein’s victims and, pursuant to the Crime Victims’
Rights Act6 (CVRA), sent letters notifying them of their statutory rights,
including the “[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
[Government] in the case.”7
1. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON
VICTIMS OF CRIME 9 (1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4YCB-X5FN] (quoting unnamed crime victim).
3. In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 1913843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1198–99.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Congress later amended the CVRA and added two more statutory
rights. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)–(10)); see also infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
7. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199 (alterations in original); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)–
(8). At the time, the CVRA afforded victims the following eight enumerated rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or
escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless
the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the
case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy.
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By May 2007, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had drafted a fifty-three-page
indictment charging Epstein with several federal offenses.8 But just four
months later, the government instead executed an “infamous”
nonprosecution agreement (NPA) with Epstein in exchange for his pleading
guilty to two state prostitution offenses.9 In June 2008, Epstein pled guilty
to his state crimes.10
At no point between the start of the investigation and the signing of the
NPA did federal prosecutors “confer” with victims about the NPA, let alone
tell them that it was under consideration.11 What is more, the government
continued to send victims boilerplate letters stating that their case was
“currently under investigation” as late as eight months after signing the
NPA.12 It was not until after Courtney Wild, one of thirty-four identified
victims, brought suit seeking enforcement of her CVRA rights in July 2008
that the government disclosed the NPA’s existence.13
Wild alleged that, by keeping her in the dark about negotiations with
Epstein and the NPA, prosecutors violated her right to confer under the
CVRA.14 The government countered that CVRA rights attach only upon
filing charges and, given the absence of any federal charges, Wild had no
CVRA rights for prosecutors to violate.15 Over the next decade, the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida issued several important rulings:
(1) that the CVRA attaches before the government brings formal charges;16
(2) that by secretly negotiating and entering into an NPA with Epstein, the
government infringed Wild’s right to confer;17 and (3) that Epstein’s death
by apparent suicide, among other facts, mooted many of the remedies sought,
including recission of the NPA.18
As directed by the CVRA, Wild petitioned the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals for a writ of mandamus to pursue her remedies.19 Earlier this year,
the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion, calling the facts “beyond scandalous”

Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004).
8. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019)).
12. Id. at 1200.
13. Id. A second, still unnamed petitioner later joined the suit, but for clarity’s sake, this
Note will refer to Wild or to the petitioner in the singular. Id. at 1200 n.4.
14. Id.
15. Government’s Response to Victim’s Emergency Petition for Enforcement of Crime
Victim Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, at 3, Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D.
Fla. 2019) (No. 08 Civ. 80736), ECF No. 15. Interestingly, prior to changing its stance once
the litigation began, the government initially took the position—in the letters it had sent to
victims—that the victims did possess CVRA rights, such as the right to confer. See In re Wild,
955 F.3d at 1227 (Hull, J., dissenting).
16. Does v. United States (Doe I), 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011); see also
Doe v. United States (Doe II), 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (extending the
application of the right to confer in particular to precharge stages).
17. Doe 1 v. United States (Doe III), 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1219–20 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
18. Doe 1 v. United States (Doe IV), 411 F. Supp. 3d 1321, 1321–31 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
19. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1202.
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and a “national disgrace” but denied Wild’s petition.20 Overruling the lower
court, the majority invoked canons of statutory interpretation and principles
of prosecutorial discretion to hold that CVRA rights attach only when
charges are filed against the defendant.21 The majority acknowledged that
its ruling “will not prevent federal prosecutors from negotiating ‘secret’ plea
and non-prosecution agreements, without ever notifying or conferring with
victims.”22 “It’s not a result we like,” the majority wrote, “but it’s the result
we think the law requires.”23
In so many ways, the Epstein case is a remarkable one.24 What this Note
ultimately proposes—internal guidelines to encourage or require prosecutors
to confer with victims—will admittedly do little if federal prosecutors are
inclined to work “hand-in-hand” with defense counsel to actively
misrepresent and keep information from victims.25 But despite its extreme
nature, the case makes evident that where there are no charges, prosecutors
by and large have no legal obligation to confer,26 nor do any Department of
Justice (DOJ) policies encourage them to confer.27 The same is true in the
states, most of which also extend to victims a conferral right.28
This Note intends to fill these gaps.29 It recommends the use of guidelines
because it ultimately accepts as a premise the general state of the law—that
20. Id. at 1198.
21. Id. at 1205. In a procedural battle, Wild contested whether the predicate issue of the
CVRA’s precharge applicability was appropriately before the court, arguing that the
government, by addressing the issue in its response to Wild’s petition instead of crossappealing that portion of the lower court’s ruling, waived any such arguments. Id. at 1205 n.6.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Wild’s argument and held that a petition for a writ of mandamus
is not an ordinary appeal but an original application and that the government was free to raise
any argument it wished in its response. Id.
22. Id. at 1221.
23. Id. at 1198. Wild successfully petitioned for en banc review, and an oral argument is
scheduled for December 3, 2020. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196
(No. 19-13843); see also Order Granting Motion to Expedite En Banc Consideration, In re
Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (No. 19-13843), ECF No. 46. The CVRA’s original cosponsors
submitted an amicus brief in support of en banc review. Brief of Senator Dianne Feinstein and
Former Senators Jon Kyl and Orrin Hatch as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc,
In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (No. 19-13843).
24. Even setting aside the Eleventh Circuit’s characterization of the case, the NPA at issue
also was “highly unusual” in that it immunized Epstein’s coconspirators from future
prosecution, none of whom had helped or cooperated with the government. Elkan Abramowitz
& Jonathan Sack, Limiting Victims’ Rights: Eleventh Circuit Reads CVRA Narrowly, N.Y.L.J.
(May 27, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/05/27/limitingvictims-rights-eleventh-circuit-reads-cvra-narrowly/ [https://perma.cc/Y2AA-LPK6].
25. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1199.
26. See id. at 1205, 1221; see also infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.A.1.
28. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
29. This Note addresses the closed universe where victims wish to exercise their conferral
rights and participate in the conventional criminal justice process. “There may well be persons
and entities entitled to notification and participation who neither expect nor particularly want
to be involved in the criminal justice process, the traditional focus of which has traditionally
been to resolve disputes between the government and an accused offender.” United States v.
Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Consequently, this Note does not consider
alternative mechanisms for seeking justice, such as restorative justice or parallel justice, nor
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legislatures have not granted and courts do not recognize a judicially
enforceable precharge victim’s right to confer.30 Part I discusses the contours
of and barriers to victim participation in the criminal process broadly and
presents procedural justice theory as a mechanism to facilitate meaningful
victim participation. Procedural justice emphasizes including and giving a
voice to stakeholders in a particular process even—and especially—where
they have limited or no control over the outcome.31 Part II looks to federal
and state laws, including pending legislation, that establish a right to confer
in order to determine whether the right attaches precharge (and thus in the
absence of charges) and what conferral entails. Last, Part III argues
reasonable conferral should occur in cases where the prosecutor intends to
exercise their nonprosecution discretion.32 Part III proposes language
encouraging or—if signing an NPA33—directing the prosecutor to confer
with the victim in such cases, subject to limitations such as the need for
confidentiality and certain administrative costs.34 Separately, this Note
does it advocate for victims to choose a particular course. For an extended discussion of the
merits of restorative justice in furthering victim’s rights, see generally DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL
WE RECKON (2019); Lara Abigail Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a
Restorative Perspective, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2020). For a discussion of the utility of
parallel justice in furthering victim’s rights, see generally SUSAN HERMAN, PARALLEL JUSTICE
FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2010).
30. See infra Part III. When referring to victim’s rights or to the eponymous social
movement, this Note uses the singular form, “victim’s rights,” instead of the plural “victims’
rights.” While the CVRA and most scholars use the latter, this Note uses the former because
these rights are not collective but individual rights. See Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim’s
Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 383 n.1.
31. See infra Part I.B.2.
32. This Note uses the phrase “nonprosecution discretion” when referring to prosecutorial
discretion to decline to bring charges, since it more appropriately describes “the discretionary
and plenary power not to prosecute.” See Alexander A. Zendeh, Note, Can Congress Authorize
Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution and Nonprosecution Agreements?: And Does It
Need To?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1451, 1453 n.16 (2017) (quoting PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 925 (6th ed. 2014)); see also infra note 84 and
accompanying text. Bringing prosecutions is a different matter—while a federal prosecution
is ordinarily initiated by the executive branch, some states do allow private prosecution on
behalf of the state. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight
of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 867–73 (2018) (recounting the near
abolishment of private prosecution in the states). Such actions are beyond the scope of this
Note, which deals with the standard public prosecution scheme.
33. This Note takes no position on the propriety of exercising nonprosecution discretion
or entering into an NPA. For select critiques on the use of NPAs in particular, see infra note
253 and accompanying text.
34. As a preface, there is a robust body of literature criticizing the trend of increasing
victim involvement in the criminal justice process. Many such concerns deal with the
undesirable consequences—including for victims—of increased victim participation in
criminal prosecution, at its core an adversarial process concerned only with the interests of the
parties to the litigation. See generally Donald J. Hall, Victims’ Voices in Criminal Court: The
Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1991); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of
Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985); Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an
Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237 (2008); Danielle Levine, Comment, Public Wrongs and
Private Rights: Limiting the Victim’s Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 335 (2010). Because this Note ultimately addresses victim’s rights in a nonprosecution
posture, it does not fully evaluate the merits of such critiques. However, to the extent that
some criticisms relate to nonprosecution alone, they are addressed in Part III. In any event,
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recognizes that potential defendants may oppose a policy that encourages or
requires prosecutors to confer with victims in a nonprosecution posture for
fear that they may well become actual defendants, and Part III also addresses
this concern.
I. VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
The crime victim was once a central player in the American criminal
prosecution—as a private citizen, she hired investigators and prosecuted
perpetrators at her own expense.35 For a variety of reasons, however,
including the idea that crime primarily damages society—not the
individual—and the embracing of a punishment apparatus to redress societal
harm, the crime victim was eventually relegated to an outsider status.36 No
longer the primary decision maker nor a direct recipient of benefits, the crime
victim came to occupy only the roles of complainant and witness for the
prosecution.37 In 1971, Lewis Powell declared that “the victims of crime
have become the forgotten men of our society.”38 With the adoption of
Federal Rule of Evidence 615 several years later, which granted either party
the right to exclude from trial any witnesses,39 including victims, the crime
victim’s exclusion was fully achieved.40
Part I.A briefly describes the rise of the victim’s rights movement against
this history of exclusion and the corresponding reinsertion of the victim into
the criminal justice process. Part I.B then narrows the focus to the utility of
victim involvement in the early stages of a criminal case and presents
procedural justice as a means for facilitating such involvement.

this Note operates under the premise that victim participation has become and will continue
to be a fixture in our criminal justice system. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in
the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 233 (2005).
35. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985
UTAH L. REV. 517, 521.
36. See, e.g., William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal
Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 654–68 (1976) (providing a
detailed examination of the victim’s declining role with the emergence of public prosecution
in the United States); see also HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at vi (“Somewhere along the
way, the system began to serve lawyers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with
institutionalized disinterest.”).
37. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution,
52 MISS. L.J. 515, 519–20 (1982); Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights?: The
Nature of the Opposition to Pro-victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 157, 158 (1992); see also McDonald, supra note 36, at 673.
38. Jill Lepore, The Rise of the Victims’-Rights Movement, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/21/the-rise-of-the-victims-rights-movement
[https://perma.cc/9N6Z-ESEM].
39. FED. R. EVID. 615 notes of advisory committee on proposed rules (omitting victims
from the list of exceptions).
40. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY AND REFERENCE GUIDE 19
(2012).
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A. A Brief History of the Victim’s Increasing Role in the Criminal Justice
Process
The victim’s rights movement began as an “unlikely marriage of
conservatism and feminism.”41 The conservative-led “tough-on-crime”
campaign found valuable fuel in a series of defendant-friendly rulings by the
Warren Court, which, in just a five-year span in the 1960s, recognized the
exclusionary rule, Miranda rights, and the right to counsel for indigent
criminal defendants.42 National crime rates, which rose steadily in the 1960s,
continued to increase and reached a peak in 1981.43 Meanwhile, women’s
groups led a successful public awareness campaign focused on rape and
domestic violence and established community-based rape crisis centers and
domestic violence shelters.44 In 1975, Susan Brownmiller published Against
Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, a particularly influential book that sought
to redefine rape as a crime of “physical assault,” not just one against “sexual
morality,” and brought public attention to the institutional insensitivity
exhibited toward sexual assault victims.45
A seminal moment arrived in 1982, when President Ronald Reagan
convened the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime.46 Partly clothed
in law-and-order rhetoric, the task force’s report opened by proclaiming,
“Something insidious has happened in America: crime has made victims of
us all.”47 The report recommended that legislatures, police, prosecutors, and
the judiciary each acknowledge, support, and include victims in the criminal
justice process.48
While many of the earliest reforms addressed victims’ services programs
and the need to ease the burden on crime victims as witnesses,49 later
proposals dealt with expanding the role of the victim beyond that of a
witness.50 Some of these proposals included: allowing victims to
communicate their views regarding a negotiated guilty plea, permitting the
use of victim impact statements at the sentencing of convicted offenders, and
41. See Lepore, supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. STEVEN DERENE ET AL., NAT’L VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACAD., TRACK 1 PARTICIPANT
TEXT: CHAPTER 2: HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 11 (2007), https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/NVAA/dspNVAA
Curriculum.cfm [https://perma.cc/6RWH-TDAE].
44. See id.; Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 118–19, 118 nn.4–5 (1984).
45. DERENE ET AL., supra note 43, at 8; see also Gittler, supra note 44, at 118 n.4.
46. See HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at ii.
47. See id. at vi.
48. See id. at 15–85.
49. See Gittler, supra note 44, at 123–24. In 1968, the federal government created the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, an agency tasked with, inter alia, funding
victim-witness programs. By 1979, it had funded over ninety such programs. See id. at 122
n.12; Marie Manikis, Contrasting the Emergence of the Victims’ Movements in the United
States and England and Wales, SOCIETIES, June 2019, at 1, 3. According to one published
review, there were 280 such programs in 1980 and by 1990 that number had risen to 5000.
LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (1996).
50. See Gittler, supra note 44, at 121–24.
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mandating financial restitution to victims as part of sentencing.51 Others
were more sweeping: the task force’s report went as far as to endorse the
adoption of a constitutional amendment that would grant victims the right “to
be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.”52
To date, more than thirty states have passed victim’s rights constitutional
amendments and all fifty have enacted some statutory victim’s rights.53
Congress has done its own part—beginning with the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982,54 it enacted a raft of legislation including the
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 199055 (VRRA), the Victim Rights
Clarification Act of 1997,56 and, most recently, the CVRA.57
B. Select Considerations for a Victim’s Involvement in the Early Stages of
the Criminal Justice Process
The gains in victim participation can be divided broadly into two
categories: (1) “service” rights, which encompass institutional responses to
the needs of victims, including compensation, assistance, and information

51. See id. at 124; see also LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FOUR YEARS LATER: A
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 4 (1986), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovc/102834.pdf [https://perma.cc/85HR-8PTZ] (summarizing state
legislation codifying some of the task force’s original victim participation recommendations);
AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR FAIR TREATMENT OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1983), reprinted in BELOOF, supra note 40, at 80, 80–82
(enumerating victim inclusion guidelines).
52. HERRINGTON ET AL., supra note 2, at 114. For comprehensive analyses on the merits
of a victim’s rights constitutional amendment, compare Robert P. Mosteller, The Unnecessary
Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 443 passim, with Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians
at the Gates?: A Reply to the Critics of the Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
479 passim.
53. See About Victims’ Rights, VICTIMLAW (Aug. 2, 2020, 10:44 PM),
https://victimlaw.org/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp [https://perma.cc/X4XT-RPDK]; see
also Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper,
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 581, 587–88 (2005).
54. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.) (allowing the use of victim impact statements at sentencing).
55. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820 (repealed 2004) (establishing enumerated
victim’s rights). The VRRA was unusually codified in title 42 of the U.S. Code. Professor
Paul G. Cassell has argued that this location meant that practitioners, who turned reflexively
to title 18 for guidance on criminal law, largely did not know about the statute. See Victims’
Rights Amendment: Hearing on H.R.J. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. and Civ.
Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 132–33 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R.J. Res. 40] (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of
Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah); H.R. REP. NO. 108711, at 4 (2004) (explaining that the need for enacting the CVRA stemmed partly from the
weaknesses of the VRRA). The VRRA also provided no means for victims to enforce their
rights, as was revealed by the nonappealable sequestration of victims in the Oklahoma City
bombing trial. See David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The Federal Crime
Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 629 (2008).
56. Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510) (clarifying
for judges a victim’s right to attend trial even if the victim plans to speak at sentencing).
57. See 150 CONG. REC. 7297 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); Kyl et al.,
supra note 53, at 585–86 (intending to give victims “the right to participate in the system”).
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regarding developments in the criminal case; and (2) “procedural” rights,
which permit victims to supply relevant information and their opinions to
criminal justice authorities at particular junctures.58 Both categories are
salient in the early stages of a criminal case, when there are articulable
societal interests in truth seeking59 as a subset of effective crime control and
in improving victim satisfaction with criminal justice decision-making.60
Part I.B.1 describes victim alienation broadly and in the lead-up to the
charging decision. Part I.B.2 introduces components of procedural justice
theory that facilitate successful victim involvement.
1. Reducing Secondary Victimization and Victim Alienation
A central motivation of the efforts to achieve and expand participatory
rights for victims is tackling the problem of secondary victimization—harm
that the government itself inflicts after the victim is already victimized by the
crime.61 Victims often describe their experiences with the criminal process
as retraumatizing, many of them expressing that they faced outright
hostility.62 Studies that focus on the impact of trials on victims note that even
where some victims reported being satisfied with the outcome, they found
the process strenuous and harmful.63 But trials are an increasingly rare
phenomenon.64 Prosecutors resolve over 95 percent of all convictions
through pleas.65 So even while victims may have a voice at trial, in reality
their voices are often excluded entirely, except at sentencing.66 This can
58. See Manikis, supra note 49, at 35–36.
59. See Stacy Caplow, What If There Is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselors” of
Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10–11, 11 n.34 (1998); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea
Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 328–29
(2007).
60. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–28; Dana Pugach & Michal Tamir, Nudging the
Criminal Justice System into Listening to Crime Victims in Plea Agreements, 28 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 45, 54 (2017).
61. See BELOOF, supra note 40, at 48; Mary Margaret Giannini, The Procreative Power
of Dignity: Dignity’s Evolution in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 43, 65
(2016); Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on
Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182–83 (2010); see also 150 CONG.
REC. 7303 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“Too often victims of crime experience a secondary
victimization at the hands of the criminal justice system.”). But see Henderson, supra note
30, at 402 (arguing that it is often difficult to attribute victim trauma to the legal process alone
and that the general lack of empirical information on how the system can best reduce trauma
does not justify modifying the criminal process around these difficulties).
62. See SERED, supra note 29, at 30–31. One crime victim stated that her “sense of
disillusionment with the judicial system is many times more painful [than the crime itself]”
and that “[she] could not, in good faith, urge anyone to participate in [the] hellish process.”
Giannini, supra note 61, at 64 (first alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 37
(1982)).
63. See SERED, supra note 29, at 31.
64. See id. at 30.
65. See id.; Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—and What
Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2017) (indicating that, in 2015, 2.9
percent of federal defendants and possibly fewer than 2 percent of state defendants went to
trial).
66. See SERED, supra note 29, at 30.
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stand in conflict with victims’ needs, as many victims report that they want
updates on the status of their cases67 and that they wish to have their voices
heard, their harm publicly acknowledged, and their experiences validated.68
Studies conducted in the United States and abroad demonstrate that victim
satisfaction correlates with victims’ sense of inclusion and empowerment in
the criminal justice process.69 And, conversely, victim dissatisfaction
correlates with an inability to participate despite an expressed desire to do
so.70
Other commentators have tied victim alienation to the “dark figure” of
unreported crime, suggesting that victims who have experienced alienation
or trauma induced by the criminal justice system may be reluctant to reach
out to authorities with their complaints in the future.71 National data shows
that the strongest predictor of victimization is previous victimization.72 And
most crime (including violent crime) is, in fact, not reported.73
These observations highlight the often reactive nature of law enforcement.
Victims, by way of their ability to “activate[] the machinery of the criminal
justice system,”74 are initial decision makers and, to the extent that decisions
made at the earliest points have the greatest capacity to affect the functioning
of the system, they occupy a critical gatekeeping role.75 From the criminal
justice system’s perspective, then, it is vital that members of the public are
willing to participate in and perform such tasks.76
67. See id. at 39.
68. See Parsons & Bergin, supra note 61, at 182.
69. See Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal
Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 162–63 (2003).
70. See id. at 163.
71. See Goldstein, supra note 37, at 518–19; see also HERMAN, supra note 29, at 40–42.
Whether low reporting or noncooperation is a direct function of negative attitudes about
criminal justice authorities remains an open question, but survey evidence illustrates that such
perceptions are a meaningful factor in reporting behavior. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 111–
12. One national survey indicates that victims underreport primarily due to a belief that police
and prosecutors will not help them. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK:
THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 11 (2016),
https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Crime-Survivors-SpeakReport-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V99L-27Z4]. Other factors that might persuade victims to
forgo participation include inconvenience, a desire to retain privacy, a lack of influence over
the process, the perceived inability of the system to effectively solve particular crimes, or a
rejection of the retributive system of justice. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of
Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 306.
72. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 71, at 7.
73. See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018, at 8 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7VS-HWWW]; see also SERED, supra note 29, at 30.
74. Karmen, supra note 37, at 158.
75. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 28; see also Deborah P. Kelly, Victims’ Perceptions of
Criminal Justice, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 15, 20 (1984) (citing studies indicating that 87 percent of
reported crime is reported by victims).
76. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 28. Victim’s rights statutory language sometimes
expressly recognizes the system’s interest in participation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 7.69.010 (2020) (recognizing “the civic and moral duty of victims . . . to fully and
voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies”). This societal
interest in participation can sometimes stand in conflict with what Professor Douglas Beloof
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Parsing negative attitudes in relation to prosecutors alone is a difficult
enterprise, in part because the prosecutorial function, unlike the police or
court function, is the least visible among criminal justice authorities.77 But
one recent national survey indicated that only one in ten victims reported
receiving assistance from a district attorney’s or prosecutor’s office.78
This minimization of the victim’s role may be acute at the outset, when the
prosecutor must decide whether to bring a charge.79 Even though the victim
frequently retains control over whether to report in the first instance,80 she
has no formal role in the charging decision.81 Of course, a prosecutor has
wide discretion to involve the victim informally at this stage and often does.
Indeed, what a victim brings to the table can be an important part of the
decision-making behind whether to charge and which particular charges to
select.82 But a prosecutor is virtually under no obligation to involve a
terms the “Victim Participation Model,” which, at its core, values the “primacy of the
individual victim” and supports the victim’s subsequent choice in deciding whether to
participate in the criminal justice process, acknowledging that the prospect of secondary
victimization may mean different things to different victims. See Beloof, supra note 71, at
296–98.
77. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 98.
78. ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 71, at 11. A possible explanation for this
experience is that prosecutors’ offices do not have a culture that emphasizes community
relations and are otherwise viewed as organizations in which an individual citizen’s interests
seem unimportant. See SEBBA, supra note 49, at 100. One scholar describes case processing
within this organizational structure as “an assembly line” of different actors “without much
oversight and quality control,” meaning that the prosecutor often has minimal contact with the
victim. See Caplow, supra note 59, at 14. In the urban criminal justice context with which she
is familiar,
[a]t the early stages of a case, before any decisions about the direction of the
prosecution have been made, the ADA [Assistant District Attorney] who eventually
will handle the trial and the plea negotiations has not even been assigned. Given
this discontinuity and disconnectedness, it is easy to see how a prosecutor can enter
a plea bargain or even dismiss a case without the complainant’s knowledge, input,
or acquiescence.
Id.
79. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process:
Fifteen Years After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 59 (1999); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
81. See Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59. In contrast, the victim often does have a role
when it comes to decisions regarding pleas, most prominently at a plea hearing where she is
able to address the court before a plea is entered. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(a)(3) (“The
court must permit a victim to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
concerning release, plea, or sentencing involving the crime.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134423(A) (2020) (“On request of the victim, the victim has the right to be present and be heard
at any proceeding in which a negotiated plea . . . will be presented to the court.”). Many states
also require prosecutors to consult with victims regarding plea negotiations. See Tobolowsky,
supra note 79, at 64 & n.168 (collecting state statutes); see also infra Part II.A.3.
82. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313; Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59. For example, it
is often the case that an adult rape victim exercises considerable control over whether the
perpetrator will be charged, a reality that predates even the enactment of victim’s rights laws.
See Beloof, supra note 71, at 300. But see generally Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853 (1994) (examining “no-drop” policies that limit a prosecutor’s
discretion to drop charges where the victim is unwilling to cooperate). Separately, and
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victim.83 What might help explain the lack of a formal, enforceable role for
victims is the settled case law indicating that an exercise of nonprosecution
discretion, for any reason (or no reason), is unreviewable.84 Another is the
well-established principle that a victim is not a prosecutor’s client.85 Even
the language in federal and state victim’s rights laws themselves is deferential
to prosecutorial discretion.86 To rectify this perceived inequity, one scholar
has proposed that victims should be accorded an enforceable right to
participate in the charging decision,87 another has recommended that victims
controversially, prosecutors also routinely consider victim characteristics in deciding whether
to pursue charges. See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to “Imperfect” Rape
Victims, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2016) (arguing that it is generally unethical for a
prosecutor to decline rape charges based on characteristics such as the victim’s race or
socioeconomic status); John W. Stickels et al., Elected Texas District and County Attorneys’
Perceptions of Crime Victim Involvement in Criminal Prosecutions, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 1, 7–9 (2007) (discussing nonlegal factors such as a victim’s age, gender, race, and
employment status).
83. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313; Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 59. There are a few
exceptions as some states have enacted legislation providing victims an opportunity to confer
with or submit statements to prosecutors prior to a final charging decision. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-4408(B); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(g) (West 2020); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-36(m) (West 2020); see also infra Part II.A.3.
84. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”);
Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[F]ederal
courts have traditionally and, to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the
instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to
prosecute persons regarding whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made.”). As the U.S.
Supreme Court elaborated when addressing passive prosecutorial enforcement, examining the
government’s charging discretion reveals the limitations of judicial review. See Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent
to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular
concern.”); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. A limited exception to
unreviewability exists under the Constitution for selective prosecution based on impermissible
criteria such as race, but such claims are largely futile due to the difficulty of obtaining
discovery. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 42–46 (1998).
85. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”);
Caplow, supra note 59, at 4–5 (noting the “critical absence of an individual client to whom a
[prosecutor] owes allegiance” and that “[n]one of the values embraced by client-centered
decision making” are present “in the prosecutorial decision about whether, whom and what to
charge”); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public
Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 596 (2019) (“Crime victims may express their preferences
and may even have a legal right to weigh in, but they are not clients.”).
86. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(A) (West 2020) (indicating that a “prosecutor’s failure to confer
with a victim . . . do[es] not affect the validity” of a decision to dismiss charges, a plea, or any
other disposition); see also infra Part II.B.3.
87. See Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian Analysis of
Victim Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 105–16 (1988).
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should be able to seek judicial review of a nonprosecution decision,88 and yet
another has gone as far as to suggest that victims should hold veto power.89
Setting aside the merits or likelihood of implementing such remedies, other
scholars have endorsed elements of procedural justice theory to improve
victim satisfaction with criminal justice decision-making broadly,
notwithstanding the outcomes of such decisions.90 The next section
introduces procedural justice theory and its purported utility for
accomplishing this goal.
2. Procedural Justice as a Vehicle for Inclusion
Procedural justice theory posits that individuals base their ideas of fairness
not just on the substance of a particular authority’s final decision but also on
the process by which that decision was reached.91 Social psychology
research reveals that while decision makers evaluate fairness primarily based
on outcomes, decision recipients focus primarily on the processes.92 More
specifically, “people care whether their treatment (and not simply their
outcomes) is fair because fair treatment indicates something critically
important to them—their status within their social group.”93 Membership in
a social group provides self-validation.94 When individuals believe that they
are being excluded, especially by an authority figure representing the state,
their sense of dignity erodes.95 As the procedural justice theorist Tom Tyler
explains, “[p]eople value the affirmation of their status by legal authorities
as competent, equal, citizens and human beings, and they regard procedures
as unfair if they are not consistent with that affirmation.”96
To the extent that victims’ experiences do not comport with these
procedural justice norms, victims may question the legitimacy of decision
makers and consequently avoid cooperating with authorities in the future.97
Scholars have proposed that legal authorities focus on four core attributes of
the process: whether (1) victims have an opportunity to share their stories
88. See Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a
Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 58 (1984).
89. See Beloof, supra note 71, at 313.
90. See, e.g., Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural
Justice, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, and the Victim’s Right to Be Reasonably Protected
from the Accused, 78 TENN. L. REV. 47, 85–103 (2010); O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–32.
The utility of procedural justice in victim’s rights reform has also been explored in the British
criminal justice system. See generally Mary Iliadis & Asher Flynn, Providing a Check on
Prosecutorial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Victims’ Right to Review Reform, 58 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 550 (2017).
91. Giannini, supra note 90, at 85; Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–22 (2008).
92. O’Hear, supra note 91, at 412.
93. Giannini, supra note 90, at 89 (quoting Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience
of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 527, 529–30 (2001)).
94. See id. at 90.
95. See id.
96. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications
for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 440–41 (1992).
97. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 88; O’Hear, supra note 59, at 327.
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(“voice”), (2) the authorities are unbiased (“neutrality”), (3) the authorities
are caring and reliable (“trustworthiness”), and (4) victims are treated with
dignity and respect (“dignity”).98 In short, even when victims disagree with
the final outcome, such as a negative charging decision or the terms of a
particular plea agreement, the presence of these attributes can nonetheless
cultivate a positive relationship with criminal justice authorities.99
Moreover, the four-factor approach outlined above helps accomplish two
major goals of the criminal justice system. The first, which parallels the aims
of victim’s rights laws, is to send a message to the victim that reaffirms their
dignity and reduces secondary victimization.100 The second is to further the
system’s utilitarian agenda, which includes not only the immediate goals of
accurate guilt determination and proportionate punishment101 but also the
larger aims of advancing effective crime control, promoting public respect
for criminal justice decision-making, and building a “satisfied citizenry.”102
Before this Note proceeds in Part III to apply procedural justice principles
to victim conferral in certain nonprosecution postures,103 Part II introduces
the right to confer and assesses its legal foundations. Part II chiefly discusses
the interrelated questions of (1) whether there is a basis to extend the
conferral right to instances where there are no charges and (2) what the law
contemplates conferral to include.
II. EXAMINING THE EXISTING RIGHT TO CONFER
The right to confer, as described by a leading hornbook on criminal
procedure, is the “most ambiguous of the lot” of victim consultation
requirements, which exist both at the federal level and in about two-thirds of
the states.104 Much of the uncertainty derives from the laws themselves.
Many state provisions fail to specify when conferral must begin, nor do they
provide any hint as to its contemplated subject matter.105 Some state
provisions, however, expressly extend the conferral right in plea negotiations
or plea agreements.106 But, few require conferral regarding an exercise of
nonprosecution discretion.107
The statutory language establishing the federal CVRA right to confer also
lacks clarity.108 This uncertainty across jurisdictions is partly explained by
a lack of case law. Vindicating their rights in court is prohibitively expensive

98. Giannini, supra note 90, at 90–91; O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27.
99. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27.
100. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 91.
101. O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27.
102. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 88–89.
103. Scholars have previously proposed applying these principles to the victim’s right to
be reasonably protected from the accused, see id. at 96–103, and to plea bargaining with a
defendant. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–32.
104. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(f) (4th ed. 2019).
105. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
106. See infra Part II.A.3.
107. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
108. See infra Part II.A.1.
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for most victims,109 is only an option at the federal level and in a few states,
and is often dependent on an unpromising petition for a writ of mandamus.110
With these shortcomings in mind, Part II focuses on two related inquiries.
First, Part II.A examines the availability of a conferral right in the absence of
charges. Second, Part II.B inspects what the law expects conferral to include.
A. Does the Conferral Right Exist Precharge?
Part II.A.1 focuses on the CVRA’s legislative history and case law, as well
as the DOJ’s interpretations of the conferral right’s precharge applicability.
Part II.A.2 considers a proposed amendment to the CVRA and its possible
impact on the legal framework. Finally, Part II.A.3 briefly examines state
conferral rights and their precharge status.
1. The CVRA
The CVRA was enacted with nearly unanimous support and little
discussion.111 It borrowed much of its language from earlier failed proposals
to adopt a victim’s rights constitutional amendment, which would have
naturally applied in both state and federal contexts.112 As a result, its
phrasing is “sparse” in “technical detail” and lacking in procedural
guidance.113 Even so, Senator Dianne Feinstein, a cosponsor of the CVRA,
proclaimed that the right to confer is “intended to be expansive” and applies
to “any critical stage or disposition of the case.”114
But most courts have not been willing to interpret this right, or any CVRA
right, quite so broadly.115 The Eleventh Circuit,116 Sixth Circuit,117 Eastern
District of New York,118 District of Connecticut,119 Northern District of
109. See Pugach & Tamir, supra note 60, at 51. Scholars have noted that both the
government and the defense possess a litigation cost advantage over the victim. Id. at 51 n.40.
For example, most of the published CVRA mandamus petitions between 2012 and 2017 reveal
cases where victims faced fewer resource constraints, either because they were corporations,
aggregated to file suit, or stood to recover a large restitution reward. Id. at 51 & n.41.
110. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(B) (indicating that the enumerated rights may be
subject to a writ of mandamus); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (directing victims to petition the court
of appeals for a writ of mandamus if the district court denies the relief sought); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-38-11(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2020) (permitting victims to bring an action for a writ
of mandamus defining or enforcing their rights).
111. Fed. Ins. Co. v. United States, 882 F.3d 348, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2018).
112. Id. at 358.
113. Id.
114. 150 CONG. REC. 7302 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). Senator Jon Kyl,
another cosponsor, agreed. Id. at 22,952.
115. See infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
116. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1196 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No.
19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.).
117. See In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting it is “uncertain” whether a
CVRA right can attach prior to the filing of charges).
118. See United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
119. See United States v. Daly, No. 11cr121, 2012 WL 315409, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 1,
2012) (holding that CVRA rights attach “no sooner than the point in time when an offense has
been charged”).
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Indiana,120 and Northern District of Ohio121 have each declined to recognize
an enforceable CVRA right prior to the filing of a charging instrument.
In United States v. Rubin,122 the Eastern District of New York found that
CVRA rights attached only once the alleged criminal conduct involving the
victims was incorporated and charged in a superseding indictment.123 The
court still acknowledged the inherent difficulty in locating a point in time
when such rights should attach.124 It noted that, “[q]uite understandably,
movants perceive their victimization as having begun long before the
government got around to filing the superseding indictment.”125 But the
court also underscored the problems associated with granting rights before
the commencement of a criminal case.126 Such rights would have to be
circumscribed by “logical limits” as it would be inaccurate to read the CVRA
to “include the victims of uncharged crimes that the government has not even
contemplated.”127
a. In re Wild: The CVRA’s Precharge Applicability Under a Microscope
Given the relative lack of CVRA case law, this year’s fifty-three-page
Eleventh Circuit decision (and sixty-seven-page dissent) in the Epstein
litigation is by far the most exhaustive judicial analysis of the CVRA’s
precharge applicability.128 The majority held that, as a matter of first
impression, the right to confer—and the entire CVRA—attaches only when
criminal proceedings are initiated, relying on: (1) the text and structure of
the CVRA, (2) the historical context surrounding its passage, and (3) the
prosecutorial discretion it intends to safeguard.129
Looking to the CVRA’s text and structure, the court evaluated each of the
eight enumerated rights and held that all attach following the institution of
criminal proceedings.130 Four of the eight rights, by their own terms, apply
120. See In re Petersen, No. 10-CV-298, 2010 WL 5108692, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010)
(holding that the CVRA right to confer arises only after a defendant is charged).
121. See United States v. Merkosky, No. 02cr-0168-01, 2008 WL 1744762, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 11, 2008) (concurring with authorities for the proposition that CVRA rights attach
only when a prosecution is underway).
122. 558 F. Supp. 2d 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
123. See id. at 429.
124. See id. at 419.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id. Some commentators have taken the Rubin court’s language to mean that it
expressly recognized the expansive nature of CVRA rights and left open the possibility that
they may attach prior to indictment. See Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During
Criminal Investigations?: Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges
Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 74 (2014).
128. See generally In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted,
No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.). Though the Eleventh
Circuit has since agreed to rehear the case en banc—and in so doing vacated the panel’s earlier
denial of a writ of mandamus—the April decision’s extensive analysis still warrants a deeper
discussion here.
129. Id. at 1205.
130. Id. at 1206–08.
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to “proceedings.”131 The court noted that a fifth right, which guarantees
victims protection from the “accused,” is best read to presuppose the
charging of a defendant.132 It also found a sixth right, which provides victims
“full and timely restitution,” to presuppose initiation, and even termination,
of a criminal proceeding.133 The remaining two rights formed the basis for
the petition.134
As for the “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government
in the case,” the court held that two contextual reasons counsel in favor of
finding that, as used in the provision, “the case” indicates an ongoing judicial
proceeding as opposed to an investigation.135 First, the majority stated that
a “case” specifically in the criminal context signifies that a proceeding has
commenced.136 Second, the majority stated that a pending case makes a
singular “attorney for the Government” easily identifiable. For the same
reason, the court noted that there are many investigations to which no
attorney is assigned.137 And, finally, as for the “right to be treated with
fairness and with respect,” the court observed that it has no temporal
restriction, explicit or implicit.138 On balance, then, and in light of the
statutory canon noscitur a sociis—that words are understood by the company
they keep—the court held that this final right is also best read to apply
postcharge.139
Wild’s main textualist arguments dealt with the CVRA’s “coverage” and
“venue” provisions.140 The first provision states that DOJ officers “engaged
in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime” must make best
efforts to ensure victims are notified of and accorded their rights.141 Though
the use of “detection” and “investigation” appear to bear on the temporal
scope of CVRA rights, the majority held that this provision is best read as a
“to whom” and not a “when” provision.142 By the same token, the majority
131. Id. at 1206; see also supra note 7.
132. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1206; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (“The right to be
reasonably protected from the accused.”).
133. In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (“The right to full and
timely restitution as provided in law.”).
134. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207.
135. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).
136. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d. at 1207. The dissent supplied its own textualist arguments
for why a criminal “case” is inclusive of an investigation. See id. at 1239 (Hull, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1207–08. The dissent noted that, as a practical matter, prosecutors are routinely
assigned to handle precharge matters and that this is especially unremarkable in white-collar
cases where defense counsel negotiate with already assigned prosecutors to obtain favorable
preindictment plea deals. See id. at 1240 (Hull, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 1208 (majority opinion).
139. Id. The dissent found the plain text of both rights invoked in the petition to be
unambiguous. That is, it treated as intentional Congress’s choice not to explicitly anchor these
two rights in temporal contexts such as a “proceeding.” See id. at 1236 (Hull, J., dissenting).
140. See id. at 1210.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (“Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and
other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, investigation,
or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of,
and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).”).
142. In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1210.
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noted that were it not to adopt that reading, there would be no textual basis
limiting the CVRA’s applicability to a later stage, such as the NPA
context.143 It would open the floodgates to requiring law enforcement
officers to consult with victims before convening a lineup, conducting a raid,
or obtaining a search warrant.144
The majority conceded that Wild stood on firmer ground with respect to
the venue provision.145 This provision directs victims to assert their rights
either in the court in which the defendant is being prosecuted or, “if no
prosecution is underway,” in the court in which the crime occurred.146 Both
the dissent and the lower court agreed that “no prosecution is underway”
must necessarily mean that the defendant has not yet been charged.147 The
majority acknowledged that this is a plausible reading.148 But when
considering the remainder of the CVRA’s text and the adverse practical
implications of Wild’s interpretation, the majority discussed alternative
readings of the venue provision more consistent with its own
interpretation.149
In its preferred reading, the majority noted that “no prosecution is
underway” could refer to the time between the filing of a criminal complaint
and a formal indictment.150 The majority supported this reading by citing the
well-established precedent that, for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, a “prosecution” begins at a defendant’s initial appearance
before a judicial officer, not at the filing of a complaint.151 The court
reasoned that this reading sensibly applies where, for instance, a victim
wishes to confer with the prosecutor after the filing of a complaint about
whether the defendant should be granted pretrial release at the initial
appearance.152
Next, the court looked at the CVRA’s historical context and compared the
Act to the earlier VRRA.153 The VRRA, by its own terms, grants victims
certain precharge rights and services.154 In essence, the court observed that
Congress obviously knew about the VRRA when it enacted the CVRA,
which repealed portions of the VRRA but left intact those provisions that
supply precharge rights and services.155 Because Congress knows how to
extend precharge rights to victims expressly, the court found Congress’s
143. See id. at 1211.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1212.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3); see also infra note 169 and accompanying text.
147. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1212, 1238.
148. See id. at 1212.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. The dissent responded by indicating that, also for the purposes of a
“prosecution,” the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial right can apply as early as the time of
arrest. See id. at 1238 n.17 (Hull, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 1213.
153. See id. at 1214.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 1214–15.
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silence when enacting the CVRA, in the face of this knowledge, to be
intentional.156
The court termed its final consideration—the principle of prosecutorial
discretion—a “weighty one.”157 Section 3771(d)(6) of the CVRA explicitly
prohibits any interpretation of the entire CVRA that “impair[s] the discretion
of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”158 The court then
indicated two ways in which the CVRA’s precharge applicability would
“impair” the very discretion the CVRA seeks to safeguard.159
First, to claim statutory protection under the CVRA, victims must
demonstrate to the court that they are crime victims as defined by the Act.160
A victim must be “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of
the commission of a Federal offense.”161 In the absence of any charges, the
court observed that it was ill-equipped to make this determination because
doing so would entail conducting a “trial” and making legal findings about
offenses yet to be identified.162 Such a proceeding, the court concluded,
would “exert enormous pressure” on the charging decision and likely impair
an ongoing investigation.163
Second, the court held that its enforcement of precharge CVRA rights
would both quantitatively and qualitatively intrude on prosecutorial
discretion.164 Quantitatively, the court stated that interventions would be
multiplied as judges would be empowered to compel prosecutors to consult
with victims before witness interviews, warrant applications, interrogations,
and the like.165 Qualitatively, the court stated that the principle of separation
of powers counsels that unless and until charges are filed—at which point the
prosecutor cedes some control and management of the case to the court—the
prosecutor’s discretion is both “exclusive” and “absolute.”166 The court
concluded that recognizing enforceable precharge rights would
“contravene[] the background expectation of executive exclusivity.”167
156. See id. at 1215. Wild did not proceed under the VRRA because, as mentioned above,
it does not grant judicially enforceable rights. See id. at 1215 n.22.
157. Id. at 1216.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
159. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1216.
160. Id. at 1217.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2).
162. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1217.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1218.
165. See id. The dissent contended that the statute itself provides the desired limiting
principles by, inter alia, qualifying the right to confer as a “reasonable” right and by explicitly
safeguarding prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 1246 (Hull, J., dissenting). But the dissent
found the late, indictment-drafting stage in Epstein’s case to warrant attachment of the
conferral right. See id. The majority construed this latter reasoning as one cleverly crafted to
capture the facts of this case without risking a slippery slope. See id. at 1221.
166. Id. at 1218.
167. Id. Apart from setting forth its own textualist arguments for why the CVRA right to
confer applies precharge, the dissent also countered the majority’s floodgates and separation
of powers by observing that “since the Fifth Circuit’s 2008 [In re Dean] decision and the
District Court’s 2011 [Doe I] decision, there has been no flood of civil suits by victims, no
evidence of victims’ abuse of their CVRA rights, and no prosecutors’ complaints about
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As of this writing, while we await a new opinion from an en banc Eleventh
Circuit, there appear to be only two federal courts remaining that have
extended the CVRA conferral right to the precharge stages of a case. Twelve
years ago, the Fifth Circuit, albeit in a case where the issue was not contested
by the parties, stated that the right to confer can apply specifically in
precharge plea negotiations.168 The court asserted that Congress, by
enacting the CVRA, made a “policy decision” that victims have a right to
inform the plea bargaining process by conferring with the government prior
to the signing of an agreement.169 And eleven years ago, the Eastern District
of Virginia, in an unpublished opinion regarding a motion in limine, agreed
with the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the CVRA can apply prior to a plea
agreement.170
b. DOJ’s Narrow Reading
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) contends that CVRA rights only
apply once the government brings formal charges.171 In a sixteen-page
opinion, the OLC analyzes the CVRA’s “text, structure, purpose, and
legislative history,” concluding that this position is the best reading of the
statute.172
Some of the OLC’s arguments, including those supporting its
interpretation of “the case” and “the attorney for the Government” within the
CVRA’s right to confer, were informally adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in
its recent decision.173 The OLC acknowledges that its narrow reading may
reduce the impact of victim participation, for instance, at a plea hearing
(assuming that there was no prior conferral), but it nonetheless emphasizes

impairment of their prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at 1226 (Hull, J., dissenting). But see supra
note 111 and accompanying text (describing cost barriers that victims face to file suit and
vindicate their rights).
168. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008). As the In re Wild majority noted,
the Fifth Circuit’s discussion of the CVRA’s precharge rights was technically dicta, given its
ultimate ruling. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d at 1219 n.25.
169. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 395.
170. See United States v. Okun, No. 08cr132, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24,
2009).
171. The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of
2004, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 OLC Opinion]. Though the document is
now ten years old, OLC opinions are treated as binding within the executive branch. See
Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448,
1451 (2010). For an opposing perspective on the OLC’s legal analysis, see generally Cassell
et al., supra note 127. Senator Jon Kyl also contested the OLC’s conclusions and subsequently
wrote two letters to then Attorney General Eric Holder arguing that the CVRA right to confer
was intended to attach precharge. See 157 CONG. REC. S7060–61 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 CONG. REC. S3608–09 (daily ed. June 8, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Jon Kyl).
172. 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 4.
173. Id. at 8–9.
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that prosecutors remain free to exercise their discretion to confer when they
please.174
On this point, the OLC’s disclaimer at the outset is noteworthy—it claims
that its final opinion is limited to examining statutory obligations under the
CVRA and that it contains no opinion on whether the DOJ should provide
rights prior to the filing of charges “as a matter of good practice.”175 Finally,
and most salient to this Note’s inquiry, the OLC unequivocally states that
conferral does not apply in the context of charging decisions, which it
believes are “beyond the ambit” of the CVRA.176
Turning to the DOJ’s guidelines, it is clear that the department has adopted
the OLC opinion. In the latest version of the “Attorney General Guidelines
for Victim and Witness Assistance” (“AG Guidelines”), the DOJ states that
“CVRA rights attach when criminal proceedings are initiated by complaint,
information, or indictment.”177 Perhaps as a nod to the OLC’s “good
practice” language, the AG Guidelines assert that prosecutors “should make
reasonable efforts” to both notify victims and consider their views about
“prospective plea negotiations.”178 There is no mention of conferral
regarding a decision not to proceed with a prosecution.179
c. Congress’s 2015 CVRA Amendment
In 2015, Congress amended the CVRA, most prominently adding a ninth
enumerated right “to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or
deferred prosecution agreement.”180 The House of Representatives’ report
accompanying the legislation expressly noted that pursuant to the OLC
opinion, federal prosecutors had not been required to notify victims about a
plea agreement or deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) that was finalized
prior to the filing of a formal charge.181 The amendment thus clarified
174. Id. at 10. The OLC noted that a subdivision of DOJ, the Environmental and Natural
Resources Division, had recommended in an internal memo that the conferral right should
apply to precharge plea negotiations. Id. at 9.
175. Id. at 2. This distinction between legal obligations and good practice also featured in
the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1221 (11th Cir.),
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020)
(mem.).
176. 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 9–10.
177. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS
ASSISTANCE
8
(2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/ag_
guidelines2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/VST9-MBMF].
178. Id. at 41; 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 2.
179. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, supra note 177, at 41–42.
180. Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 144-22, 129 Stat. 227, 240
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)–(10)). Plea agreements and DPAs are similar in that both
require court involvement, while NPAs do not. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818
F.3d 733, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that charges are filed subject to DPAs, but that
none are filed subject to NPAs, where the agreement is maintained by the parties alone).
Separately, the In re Wild decision considered the CVRA at the time the underlying litigation
commenced (2008), and so it did not incorporate this amendment into its analysis. See In re
Wild, 955 F.3d at 1231 (Hull, J., dissenting).
181. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-7, at 7 (2015).

2020]

SECRET FAITS ACCOMPLIS

365

Congress’s intent that crime victims be notified of such agreements, even if
they are reached precharge.182 Shortly after the amendment was enacted, the
DOJ filed a brief in the Southern District of New York, again arguing that
the CVRA applies only after criminal charges are filed or in the “closelyrelated context of plea bargains or deferred prosecution agreements.”183 In
short, the DOJ maintained that outside the narrow context of the newly
enacted amendment, CVRA rights were still tied to the commencement of
criminal proceedings.184
As this section has illustrated, courts have mainly confronted the issue of
a precharge right to confer in the context of either plea negotiations or related
negotiations implicating an NPA. Outside of the Epstein litigation
culminating with In re Wild, no federal court has addressed whether the
CVRA right to confer exists in a nonprosecution posture.185 The next section
briefly examines pending legislation to further amend the CVRA and
discusses its implications for a precharge right to confer.
2. The Proposed Amendment to the CVRA
On October 17, 2019, Representative Jackie Speier introduced the
Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019,186 named in
honor of Epstein’s victim.187 The bill proposes to expand the right to confer
to include conferral “about any plea bargain or other resolution of the case
before such plea bargain or resolution is presented to the court or otherwise
finalized.”188 Relatedly, it seeks to further amend the 2015 enactment of the
right to notification of plea bargains and DPAs by adding the right to

182. Id.
183. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss the Petition at 5, Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 173 F. Supp. 3d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(No. 15 Civ. 1028), ECF No. 17.
184. Id. In a 2017 brief filed in the Southern District of Florida, DOJ read the new
amendment to not require advance notice of a plea offer or a proposed deferred prosecution
agreement but rather notice “in a timely manner” after such an agreement has come into
existence. See Government’s Response and Opposition to Petitioners’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Doe III, 359 F. Supp. 3d
1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 08 Civ. 80736), ECF No. 408.
185. See Jordan, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (observing that no federal court has addressed
whether CVRA rights can be invoked at pre-negotiation stages, such as the investigatory
stage); KERSTIN BRAUN, VICTIM PARTICIPATION RIGHTS: VARIATION ACROSS CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 109–10 (2019) (noting that the application of CVRA rights to a
nonprosecution context appears “opaque”).
186. H.R. 4729, 116th Cong. (2019). Among its proposals are a fee-shifting provision for
attorneys’ fees and expenses and an award of up to $15,000 for intentional violations of CVRA
rights. See id. §§ 2–3. Given the existing cost barriers to vindicating CVRA rights, these
provisions may help relieve such burdens. See supra note 109 and accompanying text
187. See Press Release, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, Rep. Speier Introduces Bipartisan
Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019 to Rectify Injustices Faced by
Epstein’s Victims, (Oct. 17, 2019), https://speier.house.gov/2019/10/rep-speier-introducesbipartisan-courtney-wild-crime-victims-rights-reform-act-of-2019-to-rectify-injustices-faced
-by-epstein-s-victims [https://perma.cc/44L5-UAZK].
188. H.R. 4729 § 2(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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notification of NPAs and any “referral of a criminal investigation to another
Federal, State, or local law enforcement entity.”189
At first glance, the provisions appear to target NPAs and associated
referrals alone, at least those that bear a resemblance to the ones employed
in the Epstein litigation. But the proposed amendment’s reference to “other
resolution[s]” may encompass certain other nonprosecution decisions.190 As
of this writing, the bill has not left the committee—it was first introduced in
the House Judiciary Committee and then referred to the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security about a month later.191
3. State Law Survey
State constitutions are replete with examples of broad language granting
rights to confer without supplying any context.192 States’ statutory conferral
rights that do contain specific language refer predominantly to plea
negotiations and plea agreements.193 In so doing, they often explicitly
provide for conferral rights only after a prosecutor files charges and dispel
the idea that such rights could apply, for instance, to precharge plea
negotiations.194 And unlike the CVRA, state provisions generally provide
no enforcement mechanisms to vindicate rights, meaning that few courts
have ever addressed the narrow question of whether conferral rights attach in
the absence of charges.195
There are, however, a few states that appear to grant victims a conferral
right with respect to an exercise of nonprosecution discretion. Tennessee
requires that its prosecutors confer with victims prior to a final disposition,

189. Id. § 2(1)(B).
190. Id. § 2(1)(A).
191. See H.R. 4729—Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4729/committees
[https://perma.cc/PY3K-BZHH] (last visited June 22, 2020).
192. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (granting “the right to confer with the
prosecution”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(4) (granting “[t]he right to communicate with the
prosecution”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (granting the “right to confer with the
prosecution”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37(1a)(h) (granting “the right to reasonably confer with
the prosecution”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(b)(3) (granting “the right to confer with a
representative of the prosecutor’s office”). But see, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(7)
(granting the right to “confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been
charged, before the trial or before any disposition and [be] informed of the disposition”).
193. See OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN # 7: VICTIM INPUT INTO PLEA
AGREEMENTS
1–2
(2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/
bulletin7/ncj189188.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WGP-TYZJ]; see also Tobolowsky, supra note
79, at 63–65, 64 nn.168–71.
194. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 104, § 13.1(a); Brown, supra note 32, at 880. This
treatment of conferral rights with prosecutors stands in contrast to notification rights in
relation to law enforcement broadly, which most states do provide early in the criminal
process, see Cassell et al., supra note 127, at 102, as does the federal government. See 34
U.S.C. § 20141(c)(3) (enumerating notice requirements to victims by a “responsible official”).
195. See Cassell et al., supra note 127, at 101; see also, e.g., Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d
81, 85 n.5 (S.C. 2000) (holding that victims obtain the right to confer once the case proceeds
to indictment).
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such as the “decision not to proceed with a criminal prosecution.”196
Massachusetts provides victims with an opportunity to confer with the
prosecution before, inter alia, an “act by the commonwealth terminating the
prosecution.”197 Meanwhile, Arizona not only requires that prosecutors
confer with victims regarding their views on a “decision not to proceed with
a criminal prosecution”198 but also mandates that prosecutors provide victims
with “the reason for declining to proceed with the case.”199 Finally, New
Jersey, while not commenting on conferral before or in the absence of
charges, permits victims to submit a written statement to the prosecution,
which must be considered before they make a final decision on whether to
file charges.200
B. What Does Conferral Include?
One may understandably think the Arizona conferral statutes, in explicitly
referencing the victim’s “views” and the prosecutor’s “reasons” for declining
charges, present concrete examples of what the law contemplates conferral
to include.201 However, in both statutory provisions and case law, the
prevailing method to explain the substance of conferral is to look to its
limitations. That is, the right to confer is often defined by what it is not meant
to encompass.202
Part II.B.1 focuses on the substance and boundaries of conferral in the
CVRA, looking to its legislative history, case law, and certain DOJ
interpretations. Part II.B.2 briefly recounts pending legislation and its
purported view on the substance of CVRA conferral. Last, Part II.B.3
examines the subject matter and limitations of conferral in the states.
1. The CVRA
Though Senator Jon Kyl, a cosponsor of the CVRA, repeatedly
emphasized the CVRA’s expansive nature in the legislative record,203 he was
equally prepared to note where its reach did not extend.204 He declared that
the right to confer did not grant the victim any authority to direct the
prosecution.205 Of course, as discussed previously, the statute itself provides
that none of its provisions can be construed to impair prosecutorial
discretion.206 That provision, as well as Senator Kyl’s commentary,
196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-114(a) (2020).
197. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3(g) (2020). The statute separately references the
filing of a nolle prosequi, or dismissal of charges, suggesting that this language may be
broader. See id.
198. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4419(A) (2020).
199. Id. § 13-4408(B).
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36(m) (West 2020).
201. See supra Part II.A.3.
202. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
203. See supra Part II.A.1.
204. See 150 CONG. REC. 7302 (2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl).
205. See id.
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
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comports with the extensive case law predating the CVRA that keeps
prosecutorial discretion fully intact.207 But courts have had some
opportunities to interpret the extent to which prosecutorial discretion may be
curtailed.
In Jordan v. Department of Justice,208 the court addressed the substance
of the right to confer. The plaintiff, Gigi Jordan, had lodged a complaint with
the authorities against her ex-husband claiming she was a victim of his
financial fraud schemes.209 She sent documents detailing fraudulent activity
to a prosecutor and subsequently met with the prosecutor for an hour to
discuss her allegations.210
Although no charges were filed against her ex-husband, Jordan filed suit
seeking enforcement of her CVRA rights, including her right to confer.211
The court did not address whether the conferral right applied at such an early
stage212 but nonetheless found that, even if it did, prosecutors had complied
with their conferral responsibilities.213 In short, the court held that receiving
and reviewing documents and meeting with the plaintiff for an hour
constituted sufficient conferral as applied to the facts.214 The court also noted
that, while individuals who feel victimized should attempt to convince
authorities to pursue prosecution, “they cannot dictate the manner, timing, or
quantity of conferrals.”215
In a Fifth Circuit case, DOJ had been contemplating criminal charges
following an explosion at a refinery that killed fifteen people and injured 170
others.216 Before reaching a plea agreement, the government filed an ex parte
motion requesting that the district court formulate procedures under the
CVRA’s exception for numerous crime victims,217 since notification would
not be “practicable” and would lead to media coverage that could “impair”
the negotiation process and prejudice the case.218
The district court promptly issued the ex parte order, which prohibited the
government from notifying the victims prior to signing the plea agreement
and directed the government to complete its CVRA obligations afterward but
in advance of the agreement being entered in court.219 The Fifth Circuit
207. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
208. 173 F. Supp. 3d 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
209. Id. at 46–47.
210. Id. at 47.
211. Id. at 48–49.
212. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss the Petition, supra note 183, at 3–4.
213. Jordan, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 52. In its briefing, the government took the rare step of
revealing that it had not even opened an investigation into the matter. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 53.
216. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2008).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2) (“In a case where the court finds that the number of crime
victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in
subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that
does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.”).
218. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 392.
219. Id. at 393.
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found a CVRA violation and held that (1) neither notification to nor conferral
with less than 200 individuals was impracticable and (2) the prospect of
impairing the negotiations through undue influence did not warrant the
abdication of conferral obligations.220 The court indicated that the “policy
decision” underlying the right of conferral meant that victims have a right to
inform the plea negotiation process, regardless of whether they seek to hinder
a particular plea offer or facilitate the reaching of another.221
These holdings help illustrate the boundaries of conferral obligations as
they relate to prosecutors seeking to exercise their discretion. Other inquiries
into conferral have indirectly focused on such discretion not by evaluating
the conduct of prosecutors but by considering affirmative requests for
information by victims themselves.222 For example, the plaintiff before the
Jordan court sought additional meetings with the government in connection
with her ex-husband’s financial fraud scheme.223 The court found this
request unavailing and remarked that the CVRA does not create a “selfeffectuating right” irrespective of its effect on “resources, any pending
investigation, or prosecutorial discretion.”224 The court observed that the
right to confer, by its own terms, is not absolute but “reasonable.”225
Similarly, the court in Rubin recognized that the term “reasonable” supplies
the government with critical flexibility and held that the informationgathering feature of the conferral right is logically constrained by its
“relevance to a victim’s right to participate” in the criminal justice process;
in short, it does not sanction “an unbridled gallop” to the information in the
government’s records.226
As for the government’s own views, DOJ has interpreted the boundaries
of the right as explained in Part II.A.1.c above. To reiterate, the AG
Guidelines reference the substance of conferral primarily in the context of

220. Id. at 395.
221. Id.; see also United States v. Stevens, 239 F. Supp. 3d 417, 423 (D. Conn. 2017)
(“Often enough, victims may urge the prosecutor to deal severely with defendants who have
hurt them. Some victims, however, may urge leniency for reasons of mercy, compassion, or
forgiveness. Whatever the views that a victim may have, the integrity of a criminal
prosecution is stronger if the prosecutor learns about these views if possible before making
major decisions in a case.”).
222. In the CVRA’s legislative record, Senator Feinstein emphasized that, to the extent that
prosecutors provide victims information or opinions, the right to confer is an appropriate
vehicle for doing so. See 150 CONG. REC. 7302 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
The Eastern District of New York has interpreted this legislative history to distinguish
conferral from the various CVRA rights to be heard—it has concluded that the conferral right
allows victims to obtain information on which they can then base their input while exercising
their rights to be heard. See United States v. Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455, 2005 WL 2875220,
at *17 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005). Instead of enacting an affirmative disclosure right, the
court reasoned, the drafters of the statute contemplated conferral as encompassing such
information transfer. Id.
223. Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
224. Id. (quoting United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)).
225. Id. at 51.
226. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasis added)
(citing Ingrassia, 2005 WL 2875220, at *17).
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plea negotiations.227 To the extent that the OLC opinion directly addresses
the relationship between discretion and conferral, it states that prosecutors
are free to confer as they wish but are not obligated to do so prior to bringing
charges.228 Where any negotiations relate to the charging decision, however,
the OLC considers them to be outside the ambit of conferral.229
2. The Proposed Amendment to the CVRA
The pending legislation to amend the CVRA does not comment on the
substance (or limitations) of conferral beyond including language that the
right to confer must extend to plea bargains or other resolutions before they
are finalized.230 Separately, however, the legislation does contemplate
imposing safeguards on any notification made to victims about NPAs or
referral to other agencies.231 For example, the bill stipulates that victims may
be required to maintain confidentiality as to any disclosed nonpublic
information learned if the government can show good cause grounded in
concern for public safety or the needs of an ongoing investigation.232 The
duty of confidentiality, in turn, is not to be greater than the one imposed on
the government or the defendant.233 Finally, as an enforcement mechanism,
the bill permits the attorney general to assess civil penalties, subject to notice
and opportunity for a hearing, for any breaches of confidentiality by
victims.234
3. State Law Survey
This section discusses three ways in which state laws indicate the
substance of and limitations to conferral by: (1) acknowledging the
importance of preserving prosecutorial discretion, (2) restricting the subject
matter of conferral by narrowly defining “crime” or “victim” in victim’s
rights laws to include only specific crimes, and (3) mandating consideration
of the victim’s views.
Just as the CVRA explicitly recognizes the established nature of
prosecutorial discretion,235 so to do the various state constitutions and
statutes that grant the right to confer, often by denying victims remedies when
prosecutors violate their rights.236 Even the scant case law available on
227. See supra Part II.A.1.
228. See supra Part II.A.1.
229. See 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 9–10.
230. Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 4729, 116th Cong.
§ 2(1)(A) (2019).
231. See id. § 2(1)(B).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
236. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(b) (prohibiting a construction of rights that impairs
prosecutorial discretion); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8A2 (prohibiting a construction of rights that
impairs prosecutorial discretion); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-303(4) (2020) (indicating that
the duty to confer does not limit prosecutors’ discretion with respect to handling charges);
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conferral237 confirms this approach and has upheld the principle that the right
to confer cannot intrude on prosecutorial discretion. For example, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the right to confer does not include
the power to direct a prosecution in any manner.238 In other instances, where
courts did not specifically address conferral rights but rather victim’s rights
broadly, they have likewise held that such rights do not empower victims to
challenge the charging discretion of prosecutors.239 Much like the federal
courts described above, a Texas court preserved this discretion when
addressing whether victims are entitled to discovery in a pending criminal
matter as part of their conferral right. It held that the state legislature sought
to rectify victim alienation by giving victims access to the prosecutor, not to
the prosecutor’s files.240
Many states also limit the application of their victim’s rights laws,
including conferral rights, by statutorily restricting the crimes that confer
victims rights.241 For instance, North Carolina defines a crime victim as any
person against whom there is probable cause to believe that one of a number
of enumerated crimes was committed, including all felonies and serious
misdemeanors.242 It also permits the district attorney to decide whether the
commission of a particular crime, if not otherwise listed, may still grant
victims status as a victim under the law.243 Colorado individually lists every
offense, act, or violation that, if committed, would grant victim status.244
And New York catalogues all offenses for which the right to confer, in
particular, is triggered and includes only certain felonies.245
Finally, some state statutes go beyond using the broad terms “confer” and
“consult” and provide some guidance as to what conferral may include. As
discussed in Part II.A.3, Arizona requires that its prosecutors confer with
victims about their “views” regarding, inter alia, a decision not to proceed
with a prosecution.246 A complementary Arizona statute requires that this

N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642(1) (McKinney 2020) (indicating that the district attorney’s failure to
confer does not void a disposition); WIS. STAT. § 971.095(2) (2020) (indicating that the duty
to confer does not limit prosecutors’ discretion with respect to handling charges); see also
Brown, supra note 32, at 863.
237. See supra Part II.A.3.
238. See State v. Layman, 214 S.W.3d 442, 453 (Tenn. 2007).
239. See, e.g., Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256, 258–59 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (finding that
victims have no right to contest prosecutors’ dismissal of charges); People v. Williams, 625
N.W.2d 132, 135 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that victims have no right to determine
whether prosecution should go forward or be dismissed); Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that prosecutorial discretion is neither contracted nor limited by
victim’s rights laws).
240. State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854, 858–59 (Tex. App. 1992).
241. The CVRA also provides a restriction, but it is a causation threshold—the victim must
be directly and proximately harmed as a result of the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A).
It does not, however, limit the definition of crimes, as any federal offense qualifies. See id.
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-830(a)(7) (2020).
243. See id. § 15A-824(1).
244. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-302(1) (2020).
245. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642(1) (McKinney 2020).
246. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4419(A) (2020).
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conferral include the “reasons” for the declination decision.247 Tennessee
likewise mandates that its prosecutors confer with victims about their views
regarding a decision not to proceed with a prosecution.248 Most other state
conferral statutes also include language referring to consideration of the
victim’s “views” or “opinions” but reject its application to preindictment
dispositions.249
As Part II illustrates, the right to confer, both under the CVRA and in the
states, can serve an important purpose in achieving victim participation in the
early stages of the criminal justice process. But what the law has not done is
extend this right to nonprosecution postures.250 To be sure, there are myriad
valid reasons for not doing so.251 Yet the general absence of an enforceable
victim’s right to confer about declination decisions does not mean that
conferral need not accompany exercises of nonprosecution discretion. The
next part proposes when and how such a conferral “right” should be
established.
III. REASONABLE CONFERRAL IN A NONPROSECUTION POSTURE
The Epstein litigation understandably drew the ire of many. How was it
possible, in a case where the government identified thirty-four victims of
alleged sex trafficking and drafted a fifty-three-page indictment, that
prosecutors would instead secretly bind themselves to an NPA? To the
Eleventh Circuit (and the lower court), there is no acceptable answer.252
NPAs are especially controversial exercises of nonprosecution discretion253
and present unique challenges to a victim’s ability to participate in the
criminal justice process.254 But exercises of nonprosecution discretion not
memorialized in NPAs and DPAs can likewise be controversial and exclude
247. Id. § 13-4408(B).
248. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-114(a) (2020).
249. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-64 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-11 (2020); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 642(1); VA. CODE § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d) (2020); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-6(a)(5)
(2020); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 880.
250. See infra Part III.A.1.
251. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.
252. See In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, passim (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted,
No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.); Doe III, 359 F. Supp. 3d
1201, 1219–20 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
253. See Zendeh, supra note 32 at 1457, 1457 & n.42. See generally Brandon L. Garrett,
The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60 (2016);
David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements and the Erosion
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013). DOJ primarily uses NPAs,
along with DPAs, in the corporate context. Their use has skyrocketed: between 1992 and
2000, DOJ negotiated thirteen such agreements, but over 500 DPAs and NPAs have been
negotiated since. See Uhlmann, supra, at 1316; 2019 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements and Non-prosecution Agreements, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2019-year-end-npa-dpa-update/
[https://perma.cc/GGD9WTB2]. Judge Emmett Sullivan, district judge for the District of Columbia, and Professor
Brandon Garrett, however, believe the use of DPAs and NPAs in the corporate context is
undesirable and that they should be used more broadly for individual offenders instead. See
Garrett, supra, at 70 & n.42.
254. See infra Part III.A.1.
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victims.255 Still, instituting victim involvement prior to a declination
decision may have adverse consequences of its own.256 Thus, striking a
balance between meaningful conferral on the one end and discretionary
decision-making on the other is critical.
Part III recommends a resolution: prosecutors’ offices should promulgate
guidelines, grounded in procedural justice, that encourage conferral with
victims in certain cases where a prosecutor decides not to file charges. And
when a prosecutor intends to sign an NPA, this Note advocates that they must
confer with victims before doing so, absent a showing of good cause. In turn,
Part III.A introduces the proposed guidelines, and Part III.B considers their
implications.
A. A Proposal to Confer
Prosecutorial guidelines offer a viable means of incentivizing prosecutors
to confer with crime victims given the general reluctance of courts to
constrain257 and the intent of victim’s rights laws to preserve prosecutorial
Part III.A.1 argues the need for conferral in some
discretion.258
nonprosecution postures, especially in the context of NPAs. Part III.A.2
presents model guidelines that prosecutors’ offices should adopt to effectuate
a conferral “right.”
1. The Need for Conferral
As Part I.B.1 illustrated, to the extent that victims may be less willing to
cooperate with criminal justice authorities because they perceive the process
and its actors as unfair or insufficiently attentive to their needs, society’s
goals of effective crime control may suffer.259 Prosecutors have a direct
impact on victims by virtue of their ability to move a case forward. But too
often, when a prosecutor elects not to bring charges, the victim’s role may be
nonexistent.260 Indeed, as one scholar has noted, the victim practically
vanishes following an arrest.261
As a consequence, the conferral right is valuable for victims as a vehicle
to both obtain information from prosecutors about important case
developments and to provide information of their own—facts or opinions that
keep the prosecution apprised of the victim’s perspectives.262 Legal
authorities recognize that conferral has clear, articulable benefits in certain

255. See generally Colin Taylor Ross, Note, Policing Pontius Pilate: Police Violence,
Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 755 (2016).
256. See infra Part III.B.
257. See supra Parts II.A.1.a, II.B.1.
258. See supra Part II.B.3.
259. See supra Part I.B.1.
260. See supra Part I.B.1; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
261. See Caplow, supra note 59, at 18.
262. See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra notes 221–22.
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precharge contexts, such as plea negotiations.263 Given that almost all
federal and state convictions are now obtained by plea bargains, this
recognition is not surprising.264
But pleas are entered into publicly before a court.265 NPAs, on the other
hand, are maintained by private parties.266 Put simply, entering into an NPA
without notice or conferral may be more damaging than entering into a plea
agreement without the same because once the former is signed, the matter is
closed and there is no later opportunity for victims to provide input.267
However, outside of possibly the Fifth Circuit268 and the Eastern District of
Virginia,269 prosecutors can freely choose to ignore victims before declining
to charge or signing an NPA.270 And states, apart from a select few,
categorically do not grant victims a right to confer in such instances.271 In
the next section and in the spirit of the OLC’s “good practice” language, as
discussed above, this Note proposes that prosecutors’ offices take it upon
themselves to fill this gap and confer in certain nonprosecution postures.272
2. A Conferral “Right” Enshrined in Prosecutorial Guidelines
As a threshold matter, federal prosecutors across the country are already
subject to certain statutory duties with respect to the fair treatment of
victims.273 The AG Guidelines set out uniform standards for prosecutors
regarding victim treatment and assistance,274 and many state statutes obligate
prosecutors to confer with victims.275
The current AG Guidelines state that prosecutors “should make reasonable
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views about,
prospective plea negotiations.”276 They go on to specify that, “[i]n
circumstances where plea negotiations occur before a case has been brought,
Department policy is these efforts should include reasonable consultation
263. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1, II.A.3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (recognizing a
crime victim’s “right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred
prosecution agreement”).
264. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(a)(3) (“The court must permit a victim to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding in the district court concerning release, plea, or sentencing
involving the crime.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4423(A) (2020) (“On request of the
victim, the victim has the right to be present and be heard at any proceeding in which a
negotiated plea . . . will be presented to the court.”).
266. See supra note 180.
267. See Doe III, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1220 & n.6 (S.D. Fla. 2019).
268. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008).
269. See United States v. Okun, No. 08cr132, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24,
2009).
270. See supra Part II.A.1.
271. See supra Part II.A.3.
272. See 2010 OLC Opinion, supra note 171, at 2.
273. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 20141(c)(3)(A)–(G) (enumerating duties to notify victims under
certain circumstances).
274. See generally OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, supra note 177.
275. See Tobolowsky, supra note 79, at 64–65, 64 nn.168–71; see also supra Part II.A.3.
276. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, supra note 177, at 41.
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prior to the filing of a charging instrument with the court.”277 Factors bearing
on the extent of conferral can include the impact on public and personal
safety, the number of victims, whether time is of the essence, and whether
there is a need for confidentiality.278
Given this useful language, this Note proposes the promulgation of victim
conferral guidelines that retain some of the discretionary elements of the
existing obligations in plea negotiations. The proposed guidelines would
read:
Prospective Declination Decisions:
(a) Conferral consists of the reasonable solicitation and consideration of
the victim’s views on any information the prosecutor shares.
(b) In serious offense279 cases, a prosecutor should make reasonable
efforts to confer with victims and provide victims with an explanation of a
forthcoming nonprosecution decision.
(c) In serious offense cases where the prosecutor enters a nonprosecution
agreement, the prosecutor shall, absent a showing of good cause, confer
with victims in a reasonable, timely manner prior to the signing of the
agreement.

The considerations that may favor or disfavor substantive conferral in both
provisions are similar to those already catalogued in the AG Guidelines with
one additional factor: whether relaying any information has the risk of
prejudicing uncharged individuals.280 Provision (c), which borrows
language from the pending legislation to amend the CVRA, treats NPAs
differently in that it requires prior conferral absent a showing of good
cause.281 Because only conferral regarding NPAs is required and the burden
is placed on the government to affirmatively prove relief from the
requirement, the guidelines do not envision a distinct remedy for victims.
This Note also endorses adoption of these guidelines in the state context.
While states like Arizona282 and, to a lesser extent, Massachusetts,283
Tennessee,284 and New Jersey,285 require prosecutors to consider victim
input before a declination decision, most states do not.286 As a result, these
277. Id.
278. See id. at 42.
279. One possible way to define “serious offenses” is to present a list of federal offenses,
in the same way that some states designate that the commission of certain crimes grants
victims eligibility to invoke their rights. See supra Part II.B.3. Another way is to provide a
list but also accord the prosecution discretion to include other offenses in its analysis, as is the
case in North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-824(1) (2020); see also infra Part III.B.2.
280. See infra Part III.B.2.
281. See Courtney Wild Crime Victims’ Rights Reform Act of 2019, H.R. 4729, 116th
Cong. § 2(1)(B) (2019). As in the bill, the good cause requirement in the proposed guidelines
is met through a showing of necessity in relation to public safety concerns or to the integrity
of ongoing investigations. See id.
282. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4408(B), -4419(A) (2020).
283. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(g) (2020).
284. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-38-114(a) (2020).
285. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36(m) (West 2020).
286. See supra Part II.A.3.
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guidelines may encourage conferral in the absence of any statutory
obligations.
Lastly, understanding how the need for prosecutorial discretion interacts
with the need for meaningful conferral is critical to the sensible
implementation of the proposed guidelines. This Note advocates adopting
the four-factor procedural justice framework once a prosecutor elects to
confer with a victim.287 The chief factor relevant here is voice—whenever
feasible, prosecutors should allow victims to share their narratives and their
views about a declination.288 Emphasizing procedural justice during
conferral helps ensure fair treatment of victims and will promote their
satisfaction with the decision-making process, even if they find the final
outcome unfavorable.289
B. Limitations on Conferral and Countervailing Concerns
Part III.B.1 examines when conferral should be initiated and Part III.B.2
excavates its substance. In doing so, both sections address several
countervailing concerns that may weigh in favor of curtailing conferral.
1. When to Begin Conferral
This Note recommends that deciding when conferral should begin is best
left to the discretion of the prosecutor. As the Rubin court observed, it makes
little sense for victims to confer soon after the time of their victimization.290
Nor is it always practical or helpful for them to do so if the government has
yet to contemplate any charges.291 To adopt such a presumption in favor of
conferral would unnecessarily burden the government, its resources, and the
pendency of various investigations.292 Ultimately, a victim-centered system
need not be a victim-ruled one.293
Professor Paul Cassell has argued that CVRA rights, including conferral
rights, should attach when an agency employee “engaged in the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime has substantial evidence that an
identifiable person has been directly and proximately harmed as a result of
the commission of a federal offense” and, in the employee’s judgment, “that
person is a putative victim of that offense.”294 This framework, however,
does not adequately address the valid concerns of the In re Wild and Rubin
courts.295 Agency personnel routinely identify victims very early on in the

287. See supra Part I.B.2.
288. See Giannini, supra note 90, at 90–91; O’Hear, supra note 59, at 326–27.
289. See supra Part I.B.2.
290. See United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
291. See id.
292. See id. at 425; see also Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).
293. See SERED, supra note 29, at 33.
294. See Cassell et al., supra note 127, at 92–93.
295. See supra Part II.A.
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criminal justice process—indeed, many notification rights turn on such
identifications.296
But, as Professor Robert Mosteller explained in his congressional
testimony on the potential hazards of enacting a victim’s rights constitutional
amendment, this identification may derive from mistakes or, worse,
dishonesty.297 Professor Mosteller recounted notable police brutality cases
in which the victims were almost charged as perpetrators, as well as the many
DNA exonerations in which victim evidence was the only evidence of the
defendant’s guilt.298 He makes clear that while the legal system is designed
to preliminarily identify a defendant at the outset, it is not often obvious who
the victim is or even whether the victim was harmed by the defendant or by
someone yet to be apprehended.299 As Professor Lynne Henderson adds,
victims can also be offenders—in the classic case of a domestic violence
victim who fights back and is thereafter charged, the questions of when and
to whom victim status should attach are difficult to resolve.300 Thus,
attaching conferral rights as early as Professor Cassell suggests and subject
only to the independent judgment of individual agency employees poses risks
that are independent of the strain on resources and prosecutorial discretion.301
Thus, the proposed guidelines offer prosecutors necessary leeway in
deciding when to begin conferral, which comports with federal and state
laws’ recognition of prosecutorial discretion.302 But the guidelines would
impose duties at stages when conferral ought to be an important
consideration—in the lead-up to a declination decision. Put another way, the
inquiries of when and whether to confer at all converge at this juncture. Both
the In re Wild and Rubin courts recognized the utility of conferral prior to a
declination decision.303 Operating under procedural justice principles, the
guidelines presume that there is a net positive benefit to effectuating conferral
before exercising nonprosecution discretion, in the absence of any
countervailing reasons.

296. See, e.g., 34 U.S.C. § 20141(c)(3) (requiring a responsible official to give victims the
“earliest possible notice” of enumerated events).
297. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 40, supra note 55, at 35–36 (statement of Robert P.
Mosteller, Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law).
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 404.
301. Needless to say, it may be also be ill-advised to tie attachment of victim status for the
purposes of the right to confer with a prosecutor to the determinations of, for example,
nonlawyer government personnel who are not subject to the phalanx of regulations, including
professional rules, that govern lawyers. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-2.101
(2018) (indicating that DOJ attorneys should familiarize themselves with the American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Standards); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2018) (setting out a prosecutor’s responsibilities).
302. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3, II.B.1, II.B.3.
303. The In re Wild majority concluded with the admonition that in the absence of criminal
proceedings, prosecutors should not secretly engage in plea negotiations or nonprosecution
agreements without conferring with victims. See In re Wild, 955 F. 3d 1196, 1221 (11th Cir.),
vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 19-13843, 2020 WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020)
(mem.); United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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2. What to Confer About
The proposed guidelines envision conferral to be straightforward—the
prosecutor provides victims the reasons for a nonprosecution decision and
the victim provides their opinions or views on the decision. DOJ already
keeps internal records of the reasons for certain declination decisions. When
a prosecutor declines charges in cases referred by any agency, DOJ’s Justice
Manual requires that the prosecutor’s files reflect that decision and the
“reason for it.”304 All NPAs signed in return for a person’s cooperation are
recorded, primarily because the terms of the agreement may become
important in future litigation and because the agreement serves to identify
individuals the government has agreed not to prosecute.305
Providing victims with the reasons for declination, subject to limitations,
furthers the procedural justice agenda—transparency may lead victims to
believe that prosecutors are neutral and trustworthy actors.306 It may
likewise demonstrate to victims that they too are respected actors in the
criminal justice system.307 Providing reasons is also a hallmark principle of
administrative law.308 To the extent that unilateral prosecutorial decisions
are properly described as administrative decisions,309 disclosures align
incentives to achieve consistency—treating similar cases in a similar
fashion.310 Unequal treatment in charging decisions is a long-standing
criticism of prosecutorial discretion.311 Insofar as a victim’s rights measure
can ameliorate this inconsistency, or at least reduce the opaque nature of
charging decisions, the larger public and not just the victim has much to
gain.312
But the subject or extent of conferral can implicate many legitimate
concerns.
As a threshold matter, navigating the prosecutor-victim

304. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 301, § 9-2.020.
305. See id. § 9-27.650.
306. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 340–41.
307. See id.
308. See Aaron L. Nielson, The Policing of Prosecutors: More Lessons from
Administrative Law, 123 DICK. L. REV. 713, 727–28 (2019).
309. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
317, 326–27 (2014).
310. See Nielson, supra note 308, at 728. But see Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have
Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483,
489 (2015) (noting that providing reasons can often conflict with other values, such as
efficiency). Selective transparency, however, as a middle ground is also problematic and can
manifest as biased enforcement. See Nielson, supra note 308, at 730–31.
311. See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1554–57 (1981).
312. See id. at 1559–60; see also Marie Manikis, Expanding Participation: Victims as
Agents of Accountability in the Criminal Justice Process, 2017 PUB. L. 63, 68–71; O’Hear,
supra note 59, at 341. The concept of using internal guidelines as a check on prosecutorial
discretion is not new, but this Note proposes that guidelines created for victim conferral about
declination decisions in particular may yield similar benefits. See, e.g., Norman Abrams,
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1971).
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relationship is a delicate process.313 A prosecutor can and should attempt to
communicate with victims prior to the conferral to set reasonable
expectations for the development of the case314 and dispel any expectation
that the prosecutor is the victim’s client or acting in the victim’s interest.315
And while procedural justice goals emphasize a victim’s “voice,” they also
value honesty and trustworthiness, which means a prosecutor should also
convey that what victims find emotionally or experientially relevant may not
hold legal importance for the case.316
Moreover, there are a number of concerns that may warrant limiting
conferral in a given matter: administrative burdens on efficiency and
transaction costs, a legitimate need for confidentiality, ethical concerns about
prejudicing uncharged individuals, or an undue victim influence on the
charging decision with ramifications for potential defendants.
Administrative burdens can arise in many forms. To start, conferral
redirects already scarce criminal justice resources.317 Some cases may
require more conferral than others. Some victims may be hard to track down.
Others may be unresponsive. And in the “assembly line” of case processing
at a district attorney’s office, which can resolve high volumes of routine, lowlevel cases with breakneck speed, conferral may incur simply prohibitive
costs.318 The ensuing delays may also prejudice defendants,319 who may
have elected, at great risk, to cooperate with the government in exchange for
nonprosecution.
The proposed guidelines account for some of these concerns. The
narrowing of eligible crimes keeps only the more serious offenses in play.320
Preserving prosecutorial discretion through language such as “reasonable
efforts” provides prosecutors with the “vital flexibility” they need when
confronting logistical difficulties.321 As the Jordan court noted with respect
to CVRA conferral, the “manner, timing, or quantity of conferrals” is
appropriately within the ken of prosecutors, not victims.322
313. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical
Conflict of De Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 731–32 (2007)
(arguing that victims should be treated as unrepresented individuals who misunderstand the
prosecutor-victim relationship).
314. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 337.
315. See id. at 333; Pokorak, supra note 313, at 731–32.
316. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 409.
317. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 332.
318. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
319. See O’Hear, supra note 59, at 332.
320. See Hearing on H.J. Res. 40, supra note 55, at 33 (statement of Robert P. Mosteller,
Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law).
321. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re
Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1246 11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, No. 19-13843, 2020
WL 4557083 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (mem.) (Hull, J., dissenting). But see O’Hear, supra
note 59, at 343 (noting the problem of “recalcitrant prosecutors” who may seek to build too
much discretion into certain guidelines).
322. See Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Separately, at least one scholar has suggested that prosecutors may enlist staff assistance to
effectuate conferral, though the use of intermediaries may incur its own costs. See O’Hear,
supra note 59, at 333. The proposed guidelines do not envision nonprosecutors leading
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Next, a legitimate need for maintaining confidentiality may justify
restricting the substance of conferral. Courts have noted this concern and
held that conferral, at least as constituted in statute, is relevant only insofar
as it accords victims a participatory right and access to prosecutors. It does
not sanction limitless information gathering.323 The AG Guidelines provide
for confidentiality as a consideration during conferral, and the proposed
guidelines would not materially change this calculus.324
The Oklahoma City bombing prosecution provides one illustration of how
the need for confidentiality may outweigh the interest in complete disclosure.
Michael and Lori Fortier, though not participants in the bombing conspiracy,
knew about the plan.325 In seeking to solidify their case against the bomber,
Timothy McVeigh, prosecutors permitted Michael Fortier to plead to lesser
charges in exchange for his testimony against McVeigh and granted Lori
Fortier immunity from prosecution for the same.326 Prosecutors knew that
the Fortiers’ testimony was vital to the case but, because the Fortiers testified
in the grand jury, which implicated secrecy rules, prosecutors could not share
with the victims why they chose to strike a deal with the Fortiers.327 One of
the prosecutors later remarked that although victims may have wanted more
serious charges pressed or a detailed explanation for the cooperation
agreement, doing so could have diverted significant prosecutorial resources
and led to the loss of critical evidence.328
The prospect of publicly disclosing statements that have a likelihood of
prejudicing uncharged individuals may also limit the substance of conferral.
DOJ ordinarily constrains these comments,329 as do ethics rules.330 But they
do not outright prohibit them.331 In fact, the American Bar Association’s
Standards for Criminal Justice, which DOJ encourages its lawyers to learn332
and which otherwise catalog concerns of prejudice to uncharged
conferral sessions. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 239 F. Supp. 3d 417, 421 (D. Conn.
2017) (“The CVRA does not contemplate that prosecutors will outsource all ‘victim’
communications to coordinators or other administrative personnel.”).
323. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.
324. See OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, supra note 177, at 42.
325. Pierre Thomas, McVeigh Friend Takes Plea Deal; Pact in Oklahoma Bomb Case
Calls for Fortier’s Testimony, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 1995), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/stories/ok080995.htm
[https://
perma.cc/VG9M-RCSQ].
326. See id.
327. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 422.
328. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 3 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 19 (1999) (statement of Beth A.
Wilkinson).
329. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 301, § 9-27.760 (limiting public identification
and allegations of wrongdoing by uncharged parties).
330. See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10(c) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017) (“The prosecutor may make a public statement explaining why criminal charges
have been declined or dismissed, but must take care not to imply guilt or otherwise prejudice
the interests of victims, witnesses or subjects of an investigation.”).
331. See supra notes 329–30.
332. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 301, § 9-2.101. But see id. (noting that the
standards are not official DOJ policy).
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individuals,333 still urge prosecutors to consult with victims prior to
The proposed guidelines
exercising nonprosecution discretion.334
contemplate, subject to the confidentiality considerations above, that
prosecutors may properly give reasons for declination without implying guilt
or prejudicing the interests of uncharged individuals.335
Finally, there may be a concern that conferral prior to declination allows
the victim to unduly influence the declination decision with undesirable
consequences for the potential defendant, including the filing of charges.336
Potential defendants may wonder whether they are up against not one but two
adversaries. Ordinarily, defendant-oriented criticisms of victim involvement
in the criminal process deal with what occurs after there is a “defendant,” in
other words, when an individual is formally accused.337
But to the extent that the argument is that the proposed guidelines will
independently create issues for potential defendants, this concern is largely
unavailing. First, while prosecutors enjoy virtually unreviewable discretion
in their charging decisions, they are still subject to constraints if they do
ultimately bring charges. The defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, bring constitutional claims of retaliation or discrimination, or even
contest the motivation of the prosecution if it was impermissibly directed by
the victim.338 Second, victims have an independent and legitimate interest
in fairness and due process; they are citizens and may even some day be
defendants.339 Professor Henderson contends that some communities, such
as racial minorities, may value procedural safeguards over a “winning at all
costs” mentality.340 Third, the stereotype of victims as vengeful is overstated

333. See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10(c) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017).
334. See id. § 3-3.4(i) (“Consistent with any specific laws or rules governing victims, the
prosecutor should provide victims of serious crimes, or their representatives, an opportunity
to consult with and to provide information to the prosecutor, prior to making significant
decisions such as whether or not to prosecute . . . .”).
335. There are already some instances of outright public disclosures of declination
decisions, which the proposed guidelines do not address. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 9, § 8.147 (2020) (requiring the state’s attorney general to issue a report when the office
declines to file charges against a police officer who kills an unarmed civilian). This
gubernatorial executive order will be superseded (in April 2021) by a statute that was recently
signed into law in the aftermath of the George Floyd protests. The statute is different than the
executive order in many key respects, but it retains the requirement that the New York
Attorney General issue a public report explaining the reasons for a declination decision. NEW
YORK EXEC LAW § 70-B(6)(b) (McKinney 2020).
336. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims’ Rights Movement Have Influence
Over Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 749, 756 & n.24
(2002) (arguing that victim input prior to finalizing dispositions such as plea agreements
constitutes an attempt to influence).
337. See supra note 34.
338. See Welling, supra note 87, at 109–113; see also supra Part II.B.3. But see Davis,
supra note 84, at 42–46 (noting the difficulty of alleging selective prosecution based on race).
339. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 417–18.
340. See id. at 418.

382

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

and, in reality, many victims can and do urge leniency.341 And fourth, as
scholars have observed, the prevailing criticism of prosecutors with respect
to victim involvement is that they are insufficiently attentive to victims’
needs, certainly not that they are victims’ surrogates.342 If prosecutors are
attentive, evidence suggests that they are more likely to persuade the victim
to adopt the prosecutor’s own interpretation of the case rather than the other
way around.343 As Professor Bennett Gershman, a former prosecutor, has
noted, most prosecutors undoubtedly believe that they have the ultimate
authority to make decisions, regardless of the victims’ views.344 Where the
guidelines are most likely to apply and alter a prosecutor’s conduct is where
a prosecutor may hesitate or be otherwise reluctant to speak to victims even,
and especially, in the absence of a justifiable reason.
CONCLUSION
Today, victim participation is a mainstay of the criminal process. No
longer limited to occupying a complainant or witness role, victims are now
present or heard at various junctures following the commencement of a
criminal proceeding. What remains unclear is what role, if any, victims
should play if there is no criminal prosecution. In particular, to what extent
should prosecutors inform and confer with victims before they ultimately
choose to exercise their nonprosecution discretion? And, at what cost?
For victims who wish to be involved in the criminal process and for whom
the earliest stages are often alienating, a declination decision has the potential
to minimize or eliminate their participation entirely. Procedural justice
theory predicts that such exclusion can result in adverse consequences not
just for victims and their respect for legal authorities but also for the public’s
perception of criminal justice decision-making writ large. Because the law
largely imposes no conferral obligations on a prosecutor prior to a charging
decision, there exist no reliable procedural principles to ensure or even
341. See SERED, supra note 29, at 28–29; Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation
in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 954 (2006); Henderson, supra note 30, at 424–
25.
342. See supra Part I.B.1.
343. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 423. The Fifth Circuit supports this perspective, as
it did not find the prospect of undue influence in engaging victims prior to a plea bargain to
constitute an impermissible burden on either the prosecution or the defendants. See In re Dean,
527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008). There is, of course, the separate issue of prosecutorial bias,
which may manifest itself by elevating some victims over others, even with similar crimes.
See id. at 428–29, 429 n.179 (indicating evidence of bias against Black and female victims);
see also supra note 82. But cf. Green, supra note 85, at 597 (indicating that the decentralized
nature of prosecutors’ offices and the lack of uniform procedures to regulate discretion lead
to different outcomes in similar cases); Leslie B. Arffa, Note, Separation of Prosecutors, 128
YALE L.J. 1078, 1124–27 (2019) (noting the different enforcement patterns across federal
districts for similar crimes). Without empirical evidence, however, it is not clear that the
proposed guidelines would create or worsen this bias on their own. To the contrary, in
encouraging or requiring conferral in cases where prosecutors may otherwise ignore victims
due to bias, the guidelines may help ameliorate this problem.
344. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s
Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 574 (2005).
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encourage conferral before a prosecutor exercises his or her nonprosecution
discretion.
To fill this void, this Note proposes the adoption of prosecutorial
guidelines, grounded in elements of procedural justice theory, that urge or,
with respect to NPAs, require prosecutors to confer with victims prior to
declination. And, in recognition of various countervailing interests, the
guidelines build in necessary flexibility. If criminal justice actors are truly
sincere in their belief that victims should be a part of the process, then they
should do their best to explain to victims why they see fit not to start the
process at all.

